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I. INTRODUCTION

A current issue in bankruptcy law is the treatment of entirety property.
The different treatments courts afford this property determines both the
amount of property subject to sale and which creditors receive the proceeds. The significance of these decisions carries beyond the bankruptcy
context to the initial credit decision, affecting how creditors structure
transactions to minimize- the risks inherent in the lending process. The
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to pursue excellence.
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Bankruptcy Code allows states to "opt out" of the federal exemptions and
replace them with exemptions afforded by the particular state.' A majority
of states have, in fact, opted out and thus state exemptions are the primary
source of determining the pool of assets to satisfy creditor claims.'
In Florida, married couples enjoy the protection of liberal exemption
laws.3 Specifically, Article X, Section 4 of the Florida Constitution protects a married couple's residence from a forced sale by a general creditor.4 In addition, a husband and wife can hold both non-residential real
property and personal property by the entirety creating similar protection.'
For example, a creditor of one spouse cannot levy and execute on property
owned by a husband and wife as tenants by the entirety.6 The purpose of
the liberal exemptions for Florida residents is to ensure the availability of
minimal assets in the event the debtor suffers financial difficulty.7
Because Florida has opted to apply its exemptions in bankruptcy proceedings, a debtor in bankruptcy enjoys the same protections afforded by
nonbankruptcy law. If one spouse files for bankruptcy, that spouse can
exempt entirety property from the pool of assets available to creditors to
the extent the property is "exempt ... under applicable nonbankruptcy
law."8 However, the bankruptcy courts' inconsistent treatment of entirety
property, both in the amount of the exemption and the distribution of the
proceeds, has created uncertainty between debtors and creditors A pri1. See infra notes 58-61 and accompanying text.
2. See infra notes 58-61 and accompanying text.
3. See Michael G. Williamson & Benjamin P. Butterfield, Florida Exemption Laws-Haven For
Debtors or Protection From Destitution?, 15 STETSON L. REv. 437, 437-41 (1986) (noting Florida
exemption laws provide debtor residents the opportunity for abuse).
4. See FLA. CONST. art. X, § 4. Article X, Section 4 provides in part:
(a) There shall be exempt from forced sale under process of any court, and no judgment,
decree or execution shall be a lien thereon, except for the payment of taxes and assessments
thereon, obligations contracted for the purchase, improvement or repair thereof, or obligations contracted for house, field or other labor performed on the realty, the following property owned by a natural person:
(1) a homestead, if located outside a municipality, to the extent of one hundred
sixty acres of contiguous land and improvements thereon, which shall not be reduced without the owner's consent by reason of subsequent inclusion in a municipality; or if located within a municipality, to the extent of one-half acre of contiguous land, upon which the exemption shall be limited to the residence of the owner
or his family;
(2) personal property to the value of one thousand dollars.
(b) These exemptions shall inure to the surviving spouse or heirs of the
owner.
Id.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.

See infra text accompanying notes 11-21.
Stanley v. Powers, 153 Fla. 359, 166 So. 843, 846 (Fla. 1936).
West Fla. Grocery Co. v. Teutonia Fire Ins. Co., 74 Fla. 220, 77 So. 209, 212 (Fla. 1917).
Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, 11 U.S.C. § 522(b)(2)(B) (1988).
See Benjamin C. Ackerly, Tenants by the Entirety Property and the Bankruptcy Reform Act,
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mary debtor concern is how much entirety property the debtor will retain
as exempt to ensure a "fresh start."'' On the other hand, creditors have
two main concerns in the bankruptcy context. The first is whether tenancy
by the entirety property is included in the bankruptcy estate to settle
claims." The second is which creditors will benefit from the distribution
of the proceeds from the sale of entirety property. 2 Because the Eleventh
Circuit Court of Appeals has not decided these issues, uncertainty continues to exist in the bankruptcy area in Florida.
This note focuses on the different treatment of entirety property by the
bankruptcy courts. Part II provides an overview of the concept of entirety
property. Part m reviews the treatment of entirety property under the old
Bankruptcy Act of 1898. Part IV analyzes the treatment of entirety property under the new Bankruptcy Code. This section also discusses how federal and Florida courts treat entirety property. Part V offers a solution to
resolve the issues involved in treating entirety property. Part VI suggests
problems the bankruptcy courts will face until Congress amends the relevant statutes.
IX. OVERVIEW OF ENTIRETY PROPERTY

Tenancy by the entirety is a form of concurrent ownership of property
enjoyed by married couples in Florida. 3 To create a tenancy by the en-

21 WM. & MARY L. REv. 701, 701 (1980); Patrick J. Concannon, Bankruptcy and Tenancy by the
Entirety Property: Its Treatment Under the Code and in the Courts, 58 UMKC L. REv. 501 (1990)

(analyzing the different treatments of entirety property under the new bankruptcy code); Lawrence
Kalevitch, Some Thoughts on Entireties in Bankruptcy, 60 AM. BANKR. L.J. 141, 145-47 (1986) (dis-

cussing the Fourth Circuit's varied treatment before the Sumy decision); Williamson & Butterfield,
supra note 3, at 453-58 (noting the different treatments of entirety property in bankruptcy); Paul C.
Wilson, "Fresh" Start or "Head Start": Missouri Courts Rethink the Role of Tenancies by the Entire-

ty in Bankruptcy, 56 Mo. L. REv. 817, 817 (1991) (noting the varied treatment of entirety property in
Missouri).
10. The Committee of the Judiciary of the House of Representatives recognized that "an individual debtor [can] take out of the estate that property that is necessary for a fresh start and for the support
of himself and his dependents." H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 176 (1978), reprinted in
1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6136.
11. See In re Anderson, 132 B.R. 657, 659 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1991).
12. See id.
13. RALPH E. BOYER, FLORIDA REAL ESTATE TRANSACTIONS § 20.02 (1992); PAUL C. GIBSON,
FLORIDA REAL ESTATE TRANSACTIONS § 5.03 (1993). There are two other types of concurrent owner-

ship of property: joint tenancy and tenants in common. See BOYER, supra §§ 20.01, .03. A thorough
discussion of these types of concurrent ownerships are beyond the scope of this note. However, a few
comments about tenants and joint tenancy are necessary in order to appreciate the significance of the
tenancy by the entirety.
Tenants In Common:

This form of concurrent ownership requires the unity of possession. GIBSON, supra, § 5.01.
Thus each tenant must be able to have use of the property. Id. Creditors of an individual tenant may
enforce a claim against the individual interest. RICHARD R. POWELL & PATRICK J. ROHAN, 4A
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tirety, the four unities of possession, title, time, and interest must be present. 14 A fifth unity of marriage distinguishes this estate from the common
law joint tenancy. 5 A married couple can create entirety property in both
realty and personalty.' 6 Thus, in Florida a husband and wife can enjoy
the protections afforded entirety property in all their assets.
There are two fundamental benefits of ownership as tenants by the
entirety. First, neither spouse may sell or encumber entirety property without the consent of the other spouse. 7 Because each spouse is considered
an owner of an entire indivisible interest in the property, both parties must
act in concert in order to convey the property.' The purpose of this rule
is to ensure that neither spouse acts unilaterally to the detriment of the
other spouse. 9 The second principal benefit is that entirety property is
not subject to levy and execution by a creditor with a claim solely against
one spouse. Thus, the non-debtor spouse is protected from the creditors
of the debtor spouse.2 ' The creditor with a single claim can only proceed
against that spouse's individual assets.22

POWELL ON REAL PROPERTY 1 605(2) (1993).

Joint Tenancy:
This form of concurrent ownership is held by two or more people and requires the four unities
of time, title, possession, and interest. GIBSON, supra, § 5.02. Each interest in a joint tenancy is subject
to claims of creditors. POWELL & ROHAN, supra, I 618[1][c]. The lien creditor would become a tenant
in common and could seek partition of the property. GIBSON, supra, § 5.02.
See generally John M. Starling, The Tenancy by the Entireties in Florida, 14 FLA. L. REV. 111
(1961) (discussing the origins and application of the concept of entirety property in Florida). But cf.
Paul Ritter, A Criticism of the Estate by the Entirety, 5 FLA. L. REV. 153 (1952) (arguing for the abrogation of the doctrine of tenancy by the entirety).
14. First Nat'l Bank v. Hector Supply Co., 254 So. 2d 777, 781 (1971). Possession requires both
husband and wife to have joint ownership and control of the property. Id. Time requires the interest to
commence simultaneously. Id. Title requires the interest to be from the same instrument. Id. Interest
requires that the spouses' interests be the same. Id.
15. Id.; see also GIBSON, supra note 13, § 5.03 (stating that marriage is required as well as unity
of interest, time, title, and possession for tenancy by the entireties).
16. Great S.W. Fire Ins. Co. v. Dewitt, 458 So. 2d 398, 400 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984). The Florida
Supreme Court has stated:
In realty matters, where property is acquired specifically in the name of the husband and
wife, we consider it to be a rule of construction that a tenancy by the entireties is created,
although fraud may be proven. But in personalty matters, a different standard obtains: not
only must the form of the estate be consistent with entirety requirements, but the intention
of the parties must be proven.
Hector, 254 So. 2d at 780 (citation omitted). Self serving statements are insufficient in establishing a
tenancy by the entirety in personalty. In re Shaland, 133 B.R. 166, 168 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1991).
17. See supra note 13; BOYER, supra note 13, § 20.02.
18. See Bailey v. Smith, 89 Fla. 303, 103 So. 833, 834 (Fla. 1925); GIBSON, supra note 13, §
5.03.
19. GIBSON, supra note 13, § 5.03.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Stanley v. Powers, 123 Fla. 359, 166 So. 843, 845-46 (Fla. 1936).
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Creditors are aware of the unique status afforded married couples who
hold property by the entirety. To ensure recourse against all of a married
couple's assets, creditors will negotiate to have both spouses liable on a
debt.' Thus, a joint creditor can levy and satisfy the debt against a greater pool of assets. The ability to levy on the entirety property diminishes
the protection available to married couples but the joint creditor usually
gives the debtor more favorable terms in exchange for for this added protection. Consequently, the joint creditor enjoys this greater protection vis-vis a single creditor under Florida law.
I. ENTIRETY PROPERTY UNDER THE OLD BANKRUPTCY AcT
The controversy with entirety property arises when a husband and wife
24
owe a joint obligation to a creditor and one spouse files for bankruptcy.
Under section 70(a)(5) of the old Bankruptcy Act, the bankruptcy estate
included all property "which prior to the filing of the petition [the debtor]
could by any means have transferred or which might have been levied
upon and sold under judicial process."' State law prohibited a spouse
from transferring entirety property or allowing creditors to levy solely
upon the debtor's interest in entirety property.26 Thus, the estate excluded
the debtor spouse's interest in entirety property.27 In addition, the debtor
received a discharge from all obligations, including the joint debts owed
with the nonfiling spouse.2 ' The discharge insulated the debtor from future personal liability on all the debts subject to the discharge. 9
After the bankrupt spouse received the discharge, the creditors with
joint claims were unable to obtain and execute a judgment against the
entirety property because only the nonfiling spouse was personally liable
on the debt.30 Therefore, the creditor could only obtain and execute a
judgment on the assets of the nonfiling spouse because the bankrupt
spouse's discharge eliminated his or her liability." This result deprived
joint creditors of the benefit of their bargain. 2

23. Williamson & Butterfield, supra note 3, at 462 (noting that creditors may also protect their
interests by securing an interest in property of the debtor).
24. See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
25. The Bankruptcy Act of 1898, ch. 541, § 70(a)(5), 30 Stat. 544, 566 (repealed 1978).
26. See supra text accompanying notes 13-22.
27. Phillips v. Krakower, 46 F.2d 764, 765 (4th Cir. 1931).
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Id.
The Phillips court noted that the purpose of the Bankruptcy Act was to distribute equitably the debtor's assets among the debtor's creditors and not to allow the debtor to use bankruptcy to
perpetrate a fraud. Id.
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A majority of courts recognized this inequitable gap in the old Bankruptcy Act and allowed joint creditors to get relief from the automatic stay
to pursue their claims in state court." The Fourth Circuit, in Reid v.
Richardson,'4 recognized that a discharge would absolve the bankrupt
debtor of all legal responsibility on debts both joint and several in the
federal courts." Consequently, ihe discharge would reduce the creditor's
joint claim to a single obligation of the nonfiling spouse.36 The court
agreed with the lower court that to allow the joint debtors to keep the
entireties property without subjecting the property to claims in bankruptcy
was tantamount to "legal fraud."37 The Fourth Circuit held that the old
Bankruptcy Act did not contemplate this result and lifted the automatic
stay to allow the joint creditor to proceed in state court to satisfy its
claim.3"
A minority of courts adhered to the literal language of the old Bankruptcy Act and allowed the bankrupt debtor's discharge.39 Therefore, if
joint creditors did not act promptly before the debtor filed for bankruptcy,
the debtor's discharge would eliminate his or her personal liability, and
the creditor would no longer be able to proceed against the entirety property for satisfaction of its claim.' The courts' inconsistent treatment of
entireties property created uncertainty for all parties under the old Bankruptcy Act.

33. Id. at 766.
34. 304 F.2d 351 (4th Cir. 1962).
35. Id. at 354.
36. See id.
37. Id. Judge Parker, to whom the Reid court cited, defined "legal fraud" as the "effectual withdrawing of the property from the reach of those entitled to subject it to their claims, for the beneficial
ownership and possession of those who created the claims against it." Phillips, 46 F.2d at 765.
38. Reid, 304 F.2d at 355.
39. See Fetter v. United States, 269 F.2d 467 (6th Cir. 1959). In Fetter, a husband and wife were
jointly liable on unsecured notes. Id. at 468. The husband filed for bankruptcy and received a discharge on all the debts. Id. After the discharge, a joint creditor of the married couple filed suit to levy
and execute on the entirety property. Id. The Sixth Circuit held that the husband's discharge relieved
him from liability on the claim and the joint creditor could not proceed on the entirety property. Id. at
471. This case illustrated the problems under the old act when the creditor did not obtain a relief from
the stay to satisfy the joint obligation. See also Harris v. Manufacturers Nat'l Bank, 457 F.2d 631, 636
(6th Cir.) (refusing to adopt a state remedy which directly conflicts with the specific requirements of
the Bankruptcy Act and noting that Congress was aware of the problem of allowing the bankrupt to
obtain a discharge without having to surrender entirety property to the trustee), cert. denied, 409 U.S.
885 (1972).
40. Harris,457 F.2d at 636; see also supra notes 24-32 and accompanying text (explaining why
the creditor could not proceed against entirety property after bankruptcy).
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IV.

ENTIRETY PROPERTY UNDER THE BANKRUPTCY CODE

The Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978,41 hereinafter referred to as the
Code, replaced the old Bankruptcy Act of 1898.42 However, the Code's
treatment of entirety property when one spouse files for bankruptcy remains uncertain. Under the Code, the initial inquiry is to determine the
status of entirety property within the estate.' The second question is to
determine the extent of the distribution of the debtor's interest in entirety
property to the creditors of the estate.4" Although these inquires seem
straightforward, the bankruptcy courts have inconsistently addressed these
issues. This section will analyze the relevant Code sections and examine
the different treatments by the courts.

A. Inclusion Within the Bankruptcy Estate
Section 541(a)(1) of the Code replaced former section 70(a) of the
predecessor act.47 Subject to a few exceptions, section 541(a)(1) creates
an estate comprised of "all legal or equitable interests of the debtor in
property as of the commencement of the case."48 This all-inclusive provision of the Code represents a significant departure from the practice under
the old act. For example, section 70(a)(5) of the old act required the debt-

or to meet a "transferability or leviability" test before inclusion within the

41. Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549 (codified as amended at
11 U.S.C. §§ 101-1330 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992)).
42. Section 401, 92 Stat. at 2682 (repealing the Bankruptcy Act of 1898). See generally U.S.
CONST. art. I, § 8 (stating that Congress has the power to establish uniform laws on the subject of
bankruptcy).
43. See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
44. In re Anderson, 132 B.R. 657, 659 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1991).
45. Id.

46. See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
47. See supra note 42.

48. 11 U.S.C. § 541(a)(1) (1988). Section 541(b) provides in part that:
Property of the estate does not include-(1) any power that the debtor may exercise solely for the benefit of an entity other
than the debtor,
(2) any interest of the debtor as a lessee under a lease of nonresidential real property
that has terminated at the expiration of the stated term of such lease before the
commencement of the case under this title, and ceases to include any interest of the
debtor as a lessee under a lease of nonresidential real property that has terminated at
the expiration of the stated term of such lease during the case;
(3) any eligibility of the debtor to participate in programs authorized under the
Higher Education Act of 1965 (20 U.S.C. 1001 et seq.; 42 U.S.C. 2751 et seq.), or
any accreditation status or State licensure of the debtor as an educational institution.
11 U.S.C. § 541(b) (Supp. IV 1992). Section 541(c)(2) provides an exception for. "A restriction on the
transfer of a beneficial interest of the debtor in a trust that is enforceable under applicable
nonbankruptcy law is enforceable in a case under this title." 11 U.S.C. § 541(c)(2) (1988).
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estate. 49 Because the debtor can not individually transfer the entirety
property, nor can creditors levy solely on the debtor's interest, the property under the old act was not subject to administration by the trustee.5
The Code, on the other hand, requires inclusion of all the debtor's legal
and equitable interests." This results in a larger estate than under the old
act.
The estate under the old act also was more limited because exempt
property under state law was specifically excluded from administration by
the trustee.52 The Supreme Court, in Lockwood v. Exchange Bank, 53 confirmed the unambiguous language of the statute holding that Congress
intended exempt property to remain with the debtor and not pass to the
trustee." Under the Code, the legislative history of section 541(a) reveals
congressional intent to depart from the Lockwood holding by including
exempt property as part of the bankruptcy estate. The legislative history
states:
Paragraph (1) has the effect of overruling Lockwood v. Exchange Bank, 190 U.S. 294 (1903), because it includes as property
of the estate all property of the debtor, even that needed for a
fresh start. After the property comes into the estate, then the debtor is permitted to exempt it under proposed 11 U.S.C. 522, and
the court will have jurisdiction to determine what property may be
exempted and what remains as property of the estate.
Therefore, all of the debtor's property interests become property of the estate
subject to exemption by another Code section.56

49. Bankruptcy Act of 1898, ch. 541, § 70(a)(5), 30 Stat. 544, 566 (repealed 1978). Section
70(a)(5) includes all "property which prior to the filing of the petition he could by any means have
transferred or which might have been levied upon and sold under judicial process against." Id.; see
also In re Koehler, 6 B.R. 203, 205 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1980) (providing an overview of the treatment
of entirety property under the pre-Code law).
50. Bankruptcy Act of 1898, ch. 541, § 70(a)(5), 30 Stat. 544, 566 (repealed 1978).
51. See 11 U.S.C. § 541 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992).
52. Bankruptcy Act of 1898, ch. 541, § 70(a), 30 Stat. 544, 565 (repealed 1978). Section 70(a)
provided that title shall vest in the trustee of a bankrupt estate "as of the date he was adjudged a bankrupt, except in so far as it is to property which is exempt." Id.
53. 190 U.S. 294 (1903).
54. Id. at 299-300.
55. H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 368 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963,
6324 (footnotes omitted).
56. Id. In addition, the Committee on the Judiciary of the House of Representatives stated:
[AIll interests, such as interests in real or personal property, tangible and intangible ...
whether or not transferable by the debtor [are included in the estate].
...Certain restrictions on the transferability of property will prevent the trustee from
realizing on some items of property of the estate. But on the whole, the trustee will be able
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To further support the all-inclusiveness of section 541(a), judges and
commentators point out that if the Code excluded entirety property from the
bankruptcy estate, then other sections of the Code would be nullities17 Specifically, sections 522(b)(2)(B) and 363(h) rely on the inclusion of entirety
property within the bankruptcy estate. Section 522(b)(2)(B) exempts the
debtor's interest in entirety property "to the extent that such interest ...is
exempt.., under applicable nonbankruptcy law."58 Section 363(h) permits
the trustee to sell the debtor's interest in entirety property provided certain
qualifications are met. 9 These two sections indicate that Congress intended
to include the debtor's interest in property by the entirety as property of the
estate and to exempt or sell the interest through other Code sections.'

to bring all property together for a coherent evaluation of its value and transferability, and
then to dispose of it for the benefit of the debtor's creditors.
H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 175-77 (1978), reprintedin 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 613637 (footnotes omitted).
57. See In re Amici, 99 B.R. 100, 102 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1989) (stating that § 363(h) authorizes
the trustee to sell the entirety property and that exempting the debtor's interest would render this section meaningless); Kalevitch, supra note 9, at 142-43; Wilson, supra note 9, at 824.
58. 11 U.S.C. § 522(b)(2)(B) (1988). Section 522(b)(2)(B) provides that
any interest in property in which the debtor had, immediately before the commencement of
the case, an interest as a tenant by the entirety or joint tenant to the extent that such interest
as a tenant by the entirety or joint tenant is exempt from process under applicable
nonbankruptcy law.
Id.
59. 11 U.S.C. § 363(h) (1988). Section 363(h) allows the trustee:
Notwithstanding subsection (f) of this section, the trustee may sell both the estate's interest,
under subsection (b) or (c) of this section, and the interest of any co-owner in property in
which the debtor had, at the time of the commencement of the case, an undivided interest
as a tenant in common, joint tenant, or tenant by the entirety, only if(1) partition in kind of such property among the estate and such co-owners is impracticable;
(2) sale of the estate's undivided interest in such property would realize significantly
less for the estate than sale of such property free of the interests of such co-owners;
(3) the benefit to the estate of a sale of such property free of the interests of coowners outweighs the detriment, if any, to such co-owners; and
(4) such property is not used in the production, transmission, or distribution, for
sale, of electric energy or of natural or synthetic gas for heat, light, or power.
Id.; see also In re Geoghegan, 101 B.R. 329, 331 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1989) (noting that if the trustee
cannot meet the requirements of § 363(h), the property must be abandoned). Congress also provided
protection for the nonfiling spouse by allowing the nonfiling spouse a right of first refusal at a sale of
entirety property. See 11 U.S.C. § 363(i) (1988). Additionally, the trustee is required to distribute the
value of the spouse's interest in the proceeds to the spouse, if the property is sold to a third party. See
11 U.S.C. § 363G).
60. See H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 176-77 (1978), reprintedin 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N.
5963, 6136-38. In addition, the House Judiciary Committee in its Report addressed the issue of whether the debtor's interest in entireties property is property of the estate when it stated:
The bill also changes the rules with respect to marital interests in property ....With
respect to other co-ownership interest, such as tenancies by the entirety, joint tenancies, and
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It is clear that section 541(a) of the Code includes property held by the
entirety. The legislative history and the interrelationships among the code
sections evidences congressional intent to include the debtor's interest in entireties property within the bankruptcy estate. Once included under section
541(a)(1), the debtor can exempt the property under section 522(b)(2)(B). If
the debtor cannot exempt the interest in the entirety property, then the trustee
may dispose of the nonexempt interest under section 363(h) provided certain
conditions are met.
B. Overview of Section 522(b)(2)(B)
Once the entirety property is included in the estate under section 541 of
the Code, the debtor is entitled to exempt certain property under section
522.61 The policy behind the bankruptcy exemptions is to permit the debtor
to come out of bankruptcy with adequate possessions to begin a fresh
start.62 Section 522(b)(1) provides a schedule of federal exemptions available to the debtor in those states which authorize the use of the federal exemptions.63 Florida, like many states, has "opted out" of the federal exemptions and allows the debtor those exemptions available under state and federal nonbankruptcy law.' The Code specifically provides for the exemption

tenancies in common, the bill does not invalidate the rights, but provides a method by
which the estate may realize on the value of the debtor's interest in the property while
protecting the other rights. The trustee is permitted to realize on the value of the property
by being permitted to sell it without obtaining the consent or a waiver of rights by the
spouse of the debtor or the co-owner, as may be required for a complete sale under applicable State law.
Id. at 6137-38 (footnotes omitted).
61. See supra text accompanying notes 54-59.
62. H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 176 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963,
6136.
63. 11 U.S.C. § 522(b)(1) (1988). Under the Bankruptcy Act of 1898, the debtor was entitled to
the exemptions in effect in the state of the debtor's domicile at the time of the filing. Bankruptcy Act
of 1898, ch. 541, § 6, 30 Stat. 544, 548 (repealed 1978).
64. FLA. STAT. § 222.20 (1991). Section 222.20 of the Florida Statutes provides:
In accordance with the provisions of s. 522(b) of the Bankruptcy Code of 1978 (11 U.S.C.
s. 522(b)), residents of this state shall not be entitled to the federal exemptions provided in
s. 522(d) of the Bankruptcy Code of 1978 (11 U.S.C. s. 522(d)). Nothing herein shall affect
the exemptions given to residents of this state by the State Constitution and the Florida
Statutes.
Id. The states that have opted out include: "Alabama, Arizona, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maine, Maryland,
Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshire, New York, North Carolina, North
Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, South Dakota, Tennessee, Utah, Virginia, West Virginia. and Wyoming." 7 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY 1 n.6 (Lawrence P. King ed., 15th ed., 1993). The legislative
history provides a list of federal nonbankruptcy law that the debtor may use to exempt property if the
states "opt-out" of the federal exemptions provided under § 522(d). H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 2d
Sess. 360 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6316. These federal laws include:
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of entirety property in section 522(b)(2)(b), stating:
Notwithstanding section 541 of this title, an individual debtor may
exempt from property of the estate the property listed in ... para-

graph (2) of this subsection ....

[A]ny interest in property in

which the debtor had, immediately before the commencement of
the case, an interest as a tenant by the entirety... to the extent
that such interest. :. is exempt from process under applicable

nonbankruptcy law.'a
The controversy in Florida, as well as other states that recognize tenancy by
the entireties, involves determining the extent the entirety interest is exempt

under applicable nonbankruptcy law.'
Under state law, a creditor cannot levy and execute a judgment on the
debtor's interest in entirety property, but a joint creditor can satisfy its claim

-Foreign Service Retirement and Disability payments, 22 U.S.C. 1104;
-Social security payments, 42 U.S.C. 407;
-Injury or death compensation payments from war risk hazards, 42 U.S.C. 1717;
-Wages of fishermen, seamen, and apprentices, 46 U.S.C. 601;
-Civil service retirement benefits, 5 U.S.C. 729, 2265;
-Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act death and disability benefits,
33 U.S.C. 916;
-Railroad Retirement Act annuities and pensions, 45 U.S.C. 228(L);
-Veterans benefits, 45 U.S.C. 352 (E);
-Special pensions paid to winners of the Congressional Medal of Honors, 38 U.S.C. 3101;
and
-Federal homestead lands on debts contracted before issuance of the patent, 43 U.S.C.
175.
Id.
65. 11 U.S.C. § 522(b)(2)(B) (1988). Congress was not clear with the treatment of entirety property under current § 522(b)(2)(B). However, the House and Senate considered changes to §
522(b)(2)(B). Napotnik v. Equibank & Parkvale Say. Ass'n, 679 F.2d 316, 321 (3d Cir. 1982). One
consideration included:
(b) Notwithstanding section 541 of this title, an individual debtor may exempt from property of the estate ....
(2) any property or interest of the debtor in property, as of the date of the filing of the
petition, to the extent that such property or interest in property is exempt or not subject to
process or levy under Federal law, other than subsection (d) of this section, or is exempt or
not subject to levy by a creditor, of only the debtor, on a simple contract whether or not
such a creditor exists, under State or local law that is applicable on the date of the 'filing of
the petition at the place in which the debtor's domicile has been located for the 180 days
immediately preceding the date of the filing of the petition, or for a longer portion of such
180-day period than in any other place.
Id. (quoting 126 CONG. REC. S15163 (daily ed. Dec. 1, 1980) and 126 CONG. REc. H9293 (daily ed.
Sept. 22, 1980)). This proposed amendment would have allowed a debtor who files for bankruptcy to
exempt that part of his entirety interest that would have been subject to claims by joint creditors. Id.
66. See 11 U.S.C. § 522(b)(2)(B) (1988).
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against entirety property.67 Does it follow that entirety property is not exempt to the extent of the amount of all joint creditors' claims in bankruptcy?
The courts are split on this issue.6" Some courts have held that so long as
one joint creditor exists on the date of the petition, the debtor's entire interest
in entirety property is available for distribution to all creditors.69 Congress
did not clearly answer this question in the language of section
522(b)(2)(B). 70 Thus, a critical two-prong inquiry remains: (1) how much of
the debtor's interest in the entirety property is available for distribution, and
(2) which creditors should benefit from the debtor's denied exemption? 7'
C. The Sumy Decision
Analyzing section 522(b)(2)(B), the Fourth Circuit held that entirety
property is not exempt to the extent of joint creditors' claims against the
estate.72 In Sumy v. Schlossberg,73 the bankruptcy trustee objected to the
debtor's exemption of entirety property under section 522. 7' The court held
that the entirety property was not exempt to the extent that the debtor and the
nonfiling spouse were indebted to joint creditors.7' The Fourth Circuit reasoned that because a joint creditor can satisfy claims with a judgment on
entirety property under state law, a debtor loses the benefit of section
522(b)(2)(B) to the extent of joint claims. 76 Therefore, the debtor's interest
in entirety property can be administered in bankruptcy under section 363(h)

67. See supra text accompanying notes 13-22.
68. Compare Napotnik, 679 F.2d at 321 (holding that the debtor's interest in the entirety property
is available to the extent of the joint obligations) with In re Amici, 99 B.R. 100, 103 (Bankr. M.D.
Fla. 1989) (holding that provided a joint creditor exists at the date of filing the petition, the debtor's
entire interest is available to satisfy the interests of all creditors pursuant to § 726).
69. Amici, 99 B.R. at 103.
70. See supra notes 65-66 and accompanying text.
71. See In re Anderson, 132 B.R. 657, 659 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1991). Much of the controversy
has centered around the application of § 522(b)(2)(B). See Amici, 99 B.R. at 102. However, after determining the amount of property available, the courts differ on whether only the joint creditors should
share in the proceeds or whether all unsecured creditors under the distribution scheme of § 726 should
share. Compare Sumy v. Schlossberg, 777 F.2d 921, 932 (4th Cir. 1985) (giving the proceeds of the
sale to only the joint creditors) with Amici, 99 B.R. at 102-03 (allowing all creditors to benefit from
the distribution of the sale proceeds). Congress has provided under § 726(a)(1) that distributions be
made first to priority claims under § 507. See 11 U.S.C. § 726(a)(1) (1988). Second, all allowed unsecured claims of both single and joint creditors shall be paid. 11 U.S.C. § 726(a)(2) (1988). This section is Congress' only articulated scheme for distribution of proceeds of the estate. Thus, the remainder of this note will focus not only on the extent of the exemption available to the debtor, but the propriety of distributing the proceeds solely to joint creditors or to all creditors that would have equal
priority under § 726(a)(2).
72. Sumy, 777 F.2d at 932.
73. 777 F.2d 921 (4th Cir. 1985).
74. Id. at 922.
75. Id. at 932.
76. Id. at 927.
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to the extent of joint claims for the benefit of joint creditors. 7 Any creditor
with a claim only against the debtor would not benefit from the sale of the
entirety property. 78 Excess proceeds, if any, would be exempt for the debt79

or.

The Sumy court refused to follow Greenblattv. Ford,0 an earlier Fourth
Circuit decision. 1 The Ford court exempted a debtor's entirety property
from the bankruptcy estate because the debtor's interest was exempt from
levy and execution by both individual and joint creditors under Maryland
law. 2 The Ford court's interpretation of section 522(b)(2)(B) focused on the
notion that an individual interest in entirety property cannot be subject to the
claims of any creditors.83 Thus, the debtor's individual interest was exempt
in bankruptcy.' The Sumy court distinguished Ford because the facts in
Ford did not indicate the presence of joint creditors.' Consequently, the
Sumy court refused to adopt the Ford court's suggestion in dicta that since an
individual interest
is exempt under state law, the exemption should apply in
86
bankruptcy.
The Sumy court voiced concern over the foreseeable consequences of
lifting the automatic stay and allowing joint creditors to pursue their claims
in state court." Guided by the fundamental bankruptcy principle of equal
treatment of similarly situated creditors, the court recognized that lifting the
stay would only create a race among joint creditors to obtain a judgment and
execution against the debtor's property. 8 State law would determine priority, and diligent creditors would be rewarded for their efforts at the expense
of other creditors. 9 Thus, the result would violate bankruptcy's equal treat-

77.
78.
79.
80.
81.

Id. at 931-32.
See id. at 927-28.
Id.
638 F.2d 14 (4th Cir. 1981).
Sumy, 777 F.2d at 926.

82. Ford,638 F.2d at 15.
83. See id.
84. See id.
85. Sumy, 777 F.2d at 926.
86. Id.
87. Id. Section 362 operates as an injunction applicable to all creditors, against the commencement or continuation of any action adverse to the debtor or the debtor's property. See 11 U.S.C. § 362
(1988).
88. Sumy, 777 F.2d at 932. The court seems to define similarly situated creditors as creditors
with claims against both spouses. See id. However, the Code under the distribution scheme of §
726(a)(2) provides equal treatment for all unsecured claims, individual and joint, despite the unique
status of joint creditors under state law. 11 U.S.C. § 726 (1988); see also supra note 68 (giving a brief
explanation of the controversy concerning the payment of joint creditors under § 726).
89. Id. at 932. Moreover, the court noted that by allowing the joint creditors to pursue their
claims in state court, each creditor could incur additional and duplicative expenses which could be
eliminated by administering the property in the bankruptcy court. See id. In addition, some joint creditors may not have the incentive to pursue their claims because of the low dollar amount, thus losing
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ment principle.' °
The Sumy court also recognized the potential problems associated with
exempting the property." A discharge in bankruptcy relieves the debtor of
personal liability on all prebankruptcy debts.92 After bankruptcy, the debtor
is no longer obligated on a joint claim with the nonfiling spouse.93 Thus, the
joint creditor can no longer proceed on the entirety property because the
claim has been reduced to one solely against the nonfiling spouse.' To protect the joint creditor's bargain, the Sumy court noted that bankruptcy courts
could allow joint creditors to proceed in state court as a condition of the
debtor's discharge, but acknowledged that some bankruptcy courts may not
allow this result.95 Additionally, the court stated that section 522(c) protects
the debtor's exempt property from the claims of creditors that arose before
the commencement of the case.96
According to the Sumy court, the debtor may use the Code's broad powers to avoid liens on the exempt property.97 The debtor, under section
522(f), may avoid any pre-petition lien to the extent the lien impairs the
exemption on entirety property." Thus, the joint creditor would be stripped

out on the opportunity to satisfy their claims against the joint debtors' property. Id.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 929-31.
92. Id. at 929. Section 524(a) of the Bankruptcy Reform Act provides:
A discharge in a case under this title(1) voids any judgment at any time obtained, to the extent that such judgment is a determination of the personal liability of the debtor with respect to any debt discharged under
section 727, 944, 1141, or 1328 of this title, whether or not discharge of such debt is
waived;
(2) operates as an injunction against the commencement or continuation of an action,
the employment of process, or any act, to collect, recover or offset any such debt as a personal liability of the debtor, whether or not discharge of such debt is waived.
11 U.S.C. § 524(a) (1988).
93. See Sumy, 777 F.2d at 929.
94. See id.
95. Id. at 930 & n.20.
96. Id. at 930-31. Section 522(c) provides: "Unless the case is dismissed, property exempted
under this section is not liable during or after the case for any debt of the debtor that arose ... before
the commencement of the case .... " 11 U.S.C. § 522(c) (1988). Thus, if the court exempted the
entirety property, after the debtor received the discharge, the property would be protected by this section from action by the creditor subsequent to the case. See id.
97. Sumy, 777 F.2d at 930.
98. Id. Section 522(f) provides in relevant part:
Notwithstanding any waiver of exemptions, the debtor may avoid the fixing of a lien on an
interest of the debtor in property to the extent that such lien impairs an exemption to which
the debtor would have been entitled under subsection (b) of this section, if such lien is(1) a judicial lien ....
11 U.S.C. § 522(f) (1988). Thus, any pre-petition liens by the joint creditor can be avoided by this
section. See id.
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of any interest the creditor had before bankruptcy. 9 In effect, exempting the
entirety property would permit the debtor to use the Code to commit "legal
fraud."'"' Therefore, the court justified removing the entirety property from
the exemption of section 522(b)(2)(B) to avoid this inequitable result."0 1
The Third and Sixth Circuit Courts of Appeals agree with the Sumy
decision."r The courts focus on the fact that under state law a joint creditor
can levy and execute on the entirety property.' As the Fourth Circuit noted, exempting the entirety property completely would allow the debtor to
achieve an improper result unavailable outside of bankruptcy." 4 Thus, the
property is not exempt under section 522(b)(2)(B). 0 5 Additionally, the
courts distribute the proceeds only to the joint creditors,"° but it is questionable whether this result is consistent with the distribution scheme of section 7 2 6 ."r°
D. Florida'sTreatment of Entirety Property
The Florida bankruptcy courts differ in their treatment of entirety property. One Florida court agrees with the approach taken by the federal court." 8
In In re Colston,"r Bankruptcy Judge George Proctor of the Middle District
of Florida, held that a debtor owing a joint obligation with the nonfiling
spouse could not exempt the entirety property."' The debtor sought to exempt personal property held with the nonfiling spouse as tenants by the
entirety."' Judge Proctor reasoned that because joint creditors can satisfy
claims against entirety property under Florida law, the property was not
exempt to the extent of joint claims in bankruptcy."' Furthermore, the
bankruptcy trustee succeeds to the rights of the joint creditors and can administer entirety property according to section 363(h)."' Thus, the trustee

99. Sumy, 777 F.2d at 930.
100. Id.; see also supra note 37 (giving a definition for legal fraud).
101. Id.
102. Liberty State Bank & Trust v. Grosslight, 757 F.2d 773, 777 (6th Cir. 1985) (noting that
judicial economy would be better served if the property were administered by the bankruptcy court);
Napotnik, 679 F.2d at 321 (holding that entirety property is not exempt to the extent of joint claims).
103. Sumy, 777 F.2d at 928 & n.13.
104. Id. at 929.
105. Id. at 932.
106. See id. None of the circuit courts have addressed why they did not follow the distribution
scheme of § 726. This issue has been addressed by Florida's state courts. See infra text accompanying
notes 111-40.
107. See supra note 71.
108. See In re Colston, 87 B.R. 193, 195 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1988).
109. 87 B.R. 193 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1988).
110. Id. at 194.
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. Id. at 195.
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can distribute the proceeds to joint creditors in an amount equal to their joint
claims.' 4 Any excess proceeds, above the amount of the joint claims, qualifies for the exemption under section 522(b)(2)(B)." 5 This approach is problematic because it ignores the distribution scheme of section 726 by creating
a sub-class of creditors
with joint claims that enjoy greater priority than other
116
unsecured creditors.
Chief Judge Alexander Paskay recognized that distributing the proceeds
from the sale of entirety property only to joint creditors was contrary to the
distribution scheme provided for in the Code. 1 7 In In re Amici,"8 the
debtor claimed as exempt certain personal property that the trustee sought to
liquidate under section 363(h)." 9 Chief Judge Paskay stated that section
522(b)(2)(B) did not create an additional exemption, but rather was a recognition by Congress of the immunity available under state law for entirety
property."' The entirety property is exempt if no joint creditors of the debtor existed at the commencement of the case.' Because there was a joint
creditor of the debtor and the nonfiling spouse, the court held that the entirety property was not exempt." The court further held that the proceeds
from the liquidation under section 363(h) should be distributed to all creditors pursuant to section 726.-123 Thus, joint creditors would have to share
equally with other unsecured creditors. 24

114. Id.
115. See id.
116. See In re Amici, 99 B.R. 100, 102 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1989). The Southern District of Florida
is in accord with Judge Proctor. In re Kimmel, 131 B.R. 223 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1991). The debtor tried
to exempt both real and personal property held as tenants by the entirety. Id. at 225. Judge Weaver
limited the exemption on the entirety property to the excess amount of the debtor's interest above the
joint claims. Id. at 231. Judge Weaver did not specifically state which creditors benefit from the inclusion of the debtor's interest in the entirety property within the estate. See id. However, the case relied
upon by Judge Weaver for a limited exemption, distributed the proceeds to the joint creditors. Id. at
228.
117. Amici, 99 B.R. at 102. Judge Paskay was one of the first Florida judges to recognize that
entirety property was not exempt when joint creditors of the husband and wife existed. In re Koehler,
6 B.R. 203, 205-06 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1980). Chief Judge Paskay reasoned that the entirety property
was not specifically exempt by statute in Florida. Id. at 205. Rather, because of the nature of the ownership interest involved which gives each tenant full undivided ownership control over the property,
such entirety property was immune from process by a single creditor. Id. at 206. However, Florida law
recognized the right of joint creditors to reach entirety property. Id. Thus, to the extent joint creditors
existed who otherwise could have reached the entirety interest under Florida law, the entirety property
was not exempt under § 522(b)(2)(B). Id. However, Chief Judge Paskay did not discuss which creditors benefitted from the inclusion of entirety property within the estate. See id.
118. 99 B.R. 100 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1989).
119. Id. at 101.
120. Id. at 102.
121. Id. at 102-03.
122. Id. at 102.
123. See id. at 102-03.
124. See id.
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Chief Judge Paskay recognized the difficulty involved in dealing with
entirety property."z Under his approach, joint creditors would be unable to
enforce a claim in bankruptcy that they could have enforced outside of bankruptcy.'26 On the other hand, distributing the proceeds to joint creditors
would set up a sub-class of creditors entitled to greater priority than the
distribution scheme set up in section 726.127 Chief Judge Paskay stated that
this distribution violates section 726 because unsecured joint creditors would
receive greater priority than other unsecured creditors.'28 Relying on Moore
v. Bay,'29 which is now codified in section 544(b), Chief Judge Paskay noted that the Supreme Court voided a chattel mortgage, not only for the benefit
of creditors that existed on the date of execution, but for all creditors who
could not have attacked the chattel mortgage under local law. 30 It follows
that, to the extent a joint creditor could have reached the property, the trustee
should liquidate the property for the benefit of all creditors under section
363(h).' Therefore, Chief Judge Paskay concluded that Congress intended
section 522(b)(2)(B) to determine the extent of the exemption under state law
while section 726 provides for the distribution of property included within
3
the estate. 1
Judge Thomas Baynes of the Middle District of Florida added an interesting twist to Paskay's approach announced in Amici. 33 On similar facts,
in In re Anderson,'"4 Judge Baynes held that if a joint creditor existed that
could "have process issue[d] under state law," the trustee can administer the
debtor's interest under section 363(h). 35 Once "the trustee administered the
property, Judge Baynes held that the entirety property lost its legal effect and
became property held as tenants in common by both husband and wife.'36
This result is based upon the fact that the trustee's sale destroyed the unities
associated with entirety property. 37 Thus, the property no longer enjoyed
any unique status, and the proceeds from the debtor's interest were subject to
distribution under section 726 for the benefit of all creditors. 3 1 Moreover,
this approach allows the joint creditor to share in the debtor's interest in

125. Id. at 102.
126. Id.

127. Id.
128.
129.
130.
131.

Id.
284 U.S. 4 (1931).
Amici, 99 B.R. at 102.
See id. at 102-03.

132. See id.
133. In re Anderson, 132 B.R. 657 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1991).

134. 132 B.R. 657 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1991).
135. Id. at 659-60.

136. Id. at 660.
137. See generally Starling, supra note 13 (discussing the concept of entirety property in Florida).
138. Anderson, 132 B.R. at 660.
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bankruptcy and satisfy any deficiency by pursuing the nonfiling spouse's
interest as a tenant in common.'39
In In re Boyd,'" Judge Lewis Killian, from the Northern District of
Florida, determined that section 522(b)(2)(B) provides a debtor with an exemption only for an amount in excess of all joint creditors' claims in bankruptcy.' 4' Judge Killian, relying on the same reasoning Judge Paskay used
in Amici, held that the proceeds from the sale of the debtor's interest should
benefit all creditors under section 726.141 Judge Killian's approach differs
from Chief Judge Paskay's approach only in the amount available for
distribution.1 43 Judge Killian limits this amount to the extent of all joint
creditor claims.'"
It is clear that the bankruptcy judges in Florida differ on the treatment of
entirety property in bankruptcy. One approach accepted by Florida courts
allows the trustee to sell the debtor's interest in entirety property and distribute the proceeds only to the joint creditors of the debtor. This creates a
sub-class of creditors not specifically provided for in the Code. In contrast, a
second approach includes entirety property within the estate and distributes
the proceeds to all creditors pursuant to section 726. A further wrinkle to this
approach allows an exemption for the debtor's interest in excess of the joint
claims in bankruptcy. This inconsistent treatment in Florida creates uncertainty in commercial transactions, and a change is needed to ensure predictability.
V. PROPOSED TREATMENT OF ENTIRETY PROPERTY

The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals has yet to determine the extent to
which entirety property is available to satisfy the claims of creditors. There
are four possible solutions for the treatment of entirety property in bankruptcy. First, the property can be included in the bankruptcy estate but exempted under section 522(b)(2)(B).14 1 Second, the court can limit the exemption available under section 522(b)(2)(B) to the debtor's interest in excess of joint obligations and distribute the proceeds from the sale of the

139. See id. This holding reversed an earlier decision by Judge Baynes of the Middle District in In
re Geoghegan, 101 B.R. 329 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1989). Judge Baynes held that entirety property is not
exempt to the extent of claims by joint creditors. Id. at 33 1-32. Additionally, Judge Baynes held that
the proceeds should go to benefit the joint creditors. Id. Judge Baynes recognized, however, that this
was inconsistent with the distribution scheme of § 726. Id. Judge Baynes reasoned that no other method appears reasonable in light of the earlier rulings by the Florida courts. Id. at 331 (citations omitted).
140. 121 B.R. 622 (Bankr. N.D. Fla. 1989).
141. Id. at 625.
142. Id.
143. See supra text accompanying notes 125-32.
144. Boyd, 121 B.R. at 624.
145. Greenblatt v. Ford, 638 F.2d 14, 15 (4th Cir. 1981).
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nonexempt interest to joint creditors."4 Third, instead of distributing the
proceeds from the sale of entirety property to joint creditors, the court can
distribute the proceeds to all creditors. 4 7 Finally, Congress can intervene
and amend the relevant bankruptcy statutes to provide a uniform result.
It is clear Congress intended to include entirety property within the bankruptcy estate. 48 The legislative history and the interrelationships among the
Code sections evidences a congressional intent to include the debtor's interest
within the estate.'4 9 Once included in the estate, the court must decide the
extent of the exemption available to the debtor under section 522(b)(2)(B) or
the amount subject to sale under section 363(h).' If the court decides to
permit the trustee to dispose of the debtor's interest, then the second inquiry
is to determine which creditors benefit from the sale.'
A. Exempt Entirety Propertyfrom the Bankruptcy Estate
One alternative is for the court to completely exempt the debtor's interest
in entirety property from the bankruptcy estate.' Section 522(b)(2)(B) excludes from the bankruptcy estate the debtor's interest in entirety property
"to the extent... exempt from process under applicable nonbankruptcy
law."'5 Under Florida law, neither a single nor a joint creditor can levy
solely on the interest of one spouse."5 When one spouse files for bankruptcy, only that spouse's interest is included in the bankruptcy estate.'55 Thus,
entirety property should be exempt from the estate because a joint creditor
cannot levy solely on the interest of the debtor. However, as the Fourth Circuit suggested, this approach offers some potential problems inconsistent
with the fundamental policies of the Code. 5
One problem results from the debtor obtaining a discharge in
bankruptcy. 57 Because a discharge insulates the debtor from personal liability and serves as an injunction against postbankruptcy collection of
prebankruptcy debts, the debtor is no longer personally obligated to the joint
creditor. Consequently, the joint creditor is unable to proceed against the entirety property after bankruptcy because the discharge reduces the joint

146. See Sumy, 777 F.2d at 932.

147.
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.

Amici, 99 B.R. at 102-03.
See supra notes 47-60 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 47-60.
See supra notes 58-60 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 44-45 and accompanying text.
See Ford, 638 F.2d at 15.
11 U.S.C. § 522(b)(2)(B) (1988).
See supra notes 6, 13-19 and accompanying text.
See Phillips v. Krakower, 46 F.2d 764, 765 (4th Cir. 1931).

156. Sumy, 777 F.2d at 932.

157. See supra notes 91-96 and accompanying text.
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creditor's claim to one against the nonfiling spouse. Although the court may
condition the discharge by permitting the joint creditor to obtain a judgment
and allow execution in state court, the joint creditor would be subjected to
the added expense of collecting the debt. Additionally, the debtor may resort
to section 522(c) to protect property that is exempt in bankruptcy. Section
522(c) provides that a creditor cannot pursue exempt property, during or after
discharge, to satisfy a debt that arose before bankruptcy.' 58 In effect, the
debtor is able to manipulate the Code to commit "legal fraud" which the
bankruptcy courts condemn."5 9
Another inequity resulting from exempting the entirety property completely from the estate is that the debtor, under section 522(f), can avoid any
prepetition judicial liens on the entirety property."6 For example, assume a
joint creditor before bankruptcy obtains a judicial lien on the entirety property. One spouse, liable on the joint debt, then files for bankruptcy before the
creditor executes on the property. The automatic stay of section 362 prohibits
the joint creditor from proceeding with its claim in state court. 6' During
the bankruptcy proceeding, the court exempts the entirety property. After the
property is exempted, the debtor may use section 522(f) to avoid the joint
creditor's lien on the property. 62 The effect of section 522(f) is to permanently strip the creditor of the lien on the property. Thus, the debtor can use
the Code's broad power to reach an improper result that Congress did not
intend. This result would not justify the inequitable harm caused to joint
creditors who bargained for the right to seek recourse against the property of
both spouses.
B. Limit the Exemption Under Section 522(b)(2)(B)
A fairer solution, that maintains the joint creditor's bargained for position, would be to limit the extent of the debtor's exemption under section
522(b)(2)(B)1 63 This alternative entails exempting the entirety property to
the "extent that such interest ...
is exempt ...
under applicable
nonbankruptcy law."'" Under Florida law, entirety property is exempt from
the claims of a creditor of one spouse. 65 However, a joint creditor can satisfy claims against the entire undivided interest of the husband and wife."6

158. See 11 U.S.C. § 522(c) (1988).
159. See supra note 37.
160. See supra notes 98-99 and accompanying text.
161. See 11 U.S.C. § 362 (1988).
162. See 11 U.S.C. § 522(f) (1988).
163. See supra notes 108-15.
164. 11 U.S.C. § 522(b)(2)(B) (1988); see also supra text accompanying notes 72-79 (providing
an example of limiting the extent of the debtor's exemption).
165. See supra text accompanying notes 17-22.
166. See supra text accompanying notes 17-23.
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Therefore, the debtor's interest in entirety property is not exempt to the extent of these joint claims. 67 In effect, this approach rejects the premise underlying the first solution, that a joint creditor cannot levy on the interest of
one spouse. Instead, this approach recognizes that because a joint creditor
can levy on entirety property under state law, the debtor's interest should not
be exempt under federal bankruptcy law." Under this approach, the trustee
can dispose of the debtor's interest in entirety property and satisfy the claims
of joint creditors while single creditors get nothing. 69 The excess proceeds,
if any, would be exempt for the debtor.'
The circuit courts agree with this approach.' By disposing of the
property under section 363(h), the courts eliminate the additional expense incurred by lifting the automatic stay and requiring joint creditors to satisfy
their claims in state court.'72 Arguably, these joint creditors bargained for a
superior position over single creditors by providing the husband and wife
more favorable terms on their obligation. 73 Thus, the joint creditor ensures
recourse against a greater pool of assets. Presumably the joint creditor relied
both on the ability to attach joint property and on the fact that a single creditor could not attach joint property. By giving the proceeds only to joint creditors, the court preserves this bargain. Therefore, the substantive rights of the
joint creditors do not change and, as a result, the court fulfills the fundamental principle that similarly situated creditors will be treated equally. 74
However, this approach assumes a narrow definition of similarly situated
creditors by only including unsecured joint creditors and excluding single
creditors with claims of equal rank in bankruptcy. Arguably, joint credit
tors bargained for certain rights to ensure recourse against property held both
individually and by the entirety by husband and wife. Interpreting section
522(b)(2)(B) narrowly to exempt the debtor's entire interest, or to dispose of
it for the benefit of all creditors, would strip the joint creditor of this negotiated advantage vis-h-vis single creditors. However, nothing in section
522(b)(2)(B) sets forth such a distribution for joint creditors.' 76 Congress
determined the treatment for similarly situated creditors under the distribution
scheme of section 726.1' Congress provided a broad meaning to similarly

167.
168.
169.
170.
171.
172.
173.
174.
175.
176.
177.

See supra text accompanying notes 74-79.
See supra text accompanying notes 74-79.
See supra text accompanying notes 72-77.
See supra text accompanying notes 75-79, 112-15.
See supratext accompanying notes 102-05.
See supra note 89.
See supra note 23 and accompanying text.
See supranote 88.
See supra notes 112-16, 126-30 and accompanying text.
See supra note 71.
See supra note 71.
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situated creditors under section 726 by requiring unsecured joint creditors to
share equally with other unsecured creditors. Thus, this approach ignores the
dictates of section 726 by creating a sub-class of priority not intended by
Congress.
C. Disallow the Exemption to the Extent of Joint Claims and Distribute the
Proceeds to All Unsecured Creditors
Under the third solution, some Florida courts recognize the problem
under the second possible solution, and instead distribute the proceeds according to section 726.78 In general, if entirety property is not exempt under Florida law, then in bankruptcy the debtor's interest in entirety property
is available to all unsecured creditors.'79 The Florida courts rely on the reasoning that once property is included in the estate, the property should be
distributed to all creditors under section 726.80 Several Florida courts have
held that to the extent a joint creditor has a claim against a debtor, entirety
property is not exempt under section 522(b)(2)(B) and is included within the
estate. "'
Joint creditors argue that because their unique status under state law
brings entirety property within the bankruptcy estate, they should benefit
exclusively from the proceeds. 8 Several Florida judges dismiss this argument, relying on a Supreme Court decision holding that the amount brought
into the estate because of the status of one creditor inures to the benefit of all
creditors.'83 The joint creditor in bankruptcy is not given any special
treatment because of its unique status under several Florida cases including
Amici, Anderson, and Boyd. 8" Thus, all unsecured creditors share equally
in the proceeds from the sale of the entirety property.' 85 This argument is
further supported by the fact that Congress did not provide any special distribution rules for the benefit of joint creditors to dispose of entirety proper86

ty.1

A stronger argument by the joint creditors is that allowing all unsecured
creditors to share equally in the entirety property proceeds changes the joint
creditors' substantive rights and elevates the benefits inuring to the single
creditor.'87 Judge Thomas Baynes noted that once the trustee realizes on the
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supra text accompanying notes 117-44.
supra notes 117-39 and accompanying text.
supra notes 117-24 and accompanying text.
supra notes 108-14, 133-44 and accompanying text.
supra notes 72-77 and accompanying text.
supra notes 129-31 and accompanying text.
supra notes 123-24, 136-38, 142 and accompanying text.
supra notes 124, 138, 142 and accompanying text.
supra note 71.
supra notes 19-23 and accompanying text (discussing the substantive rights of joint credi-
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debtor's interest under section 363(h), the entirety property loses its unique
status and becomes property held as tenants in common by husband and
wife.' Thus, the nonfiling spouse's proceeds would lose its entirety status." 9 Although the joint creditor lost the priority that the creditor would
have against the filing spouse under Florida law, the discharge would not
affect the joint creditor's entire claim because the nonfiling spouse would
remain liable on the debt."9 Consequently, the joint creditor could proceed
against all of the nonfiling spouse's assets, including proceeds from entirety
property. 9 ' Arguably, in some situations, the joint creditor will not realize
the full value of its claim. Even so, the loss realized by the joint creditor can
be rationalized as a cost Congress imposed on joint creditors in bankruptcy
because of the distribution scheme of section 726."9 Joint creditors can alleviate this problem either by lobbying Congress to provide better protection
for their status or by securing a consensual lien that enjoys greater priority
over unsecured creditors in bankruptcy.
Another argument suggesting that the substantive rights of joint creditors
do not significantly change, focuses on the notion that the creditor does not
have a fixed bargain. As noted earlier, joint creditors negotiate terms in order
to obtain the greatest amount of leverage from debtors. By obligating both
spouses, the joint creditor ensures recourse against all available assets, including entirety property. However, this assumes the entirety property is still
available when the debtor defaults. As one commentator noted, outside of
bankruptcy the debtor can voluntarily decide to liquidate the entirety property
and satisfy the most problematic creditors with the proceeds.193 Such debts
may be of creditors with a claim against only one spouse. Thus, the unsecured joint creditor loses its unique position because the debtor chose to
liquidate the entirety property in favor of another creditor. As such, the status
of the entirety is merely fortuitous, and the joint creditor is dependent on the
availability of the property in order to enjoy its bargain.

tors). The Fourth Circuit in Sumy questioned the exemption because under state law the joint creditors
of a married couple could levy and execute on the entirety property. Sumy, 777 F.2d at 928. Thus,
distributing the proceeds to all creditors would change the substantive rights allowed under state law.
See id.
188. Anderson, 132 B.R. at 660.
189. Id.
190. See supra note 13 (discussing creditors' rights when property is held as tenants in common).
191. See supranotes 23, 136-39 and accompanying text.
192. See supra text accompanying notes 127-28 (discussing the § 726 distribution scheme which
contemplates equal distribution to similarly situated creditors).
193. Kalevitch, supra note 9, at 148-49.
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D. Congress Should Amend the Relevant Code Sections
The fourth alternative would be for Congress to amend the relevant Code
Sections and expressly articulate the treatment of entirety property when one
spouse files for bankruptcy." Congress has a mandate to provide national
bankruptcy laws. 9 5 When uncertainty exists to the extent found under section 522, the original purpose of having uniform laws is undercut. Debtors
are unsure of their rights, or worse, they use the differences in the laws to
file bankruptcy in a favorable forum. For example, the debtor can exempt the
amount in excess of joint obligations by filing in the Northern District of
Florida.'96 However, in Chief Judge Paskay's or Judge Baynes' court, if a
joint creditor exists, the debtor's whole interest in entirety property becomes
available to satisfy all creditors' claims. 7 This uncertainty forces traditionally conservative creditors to charge higher interest rates to compensate for
the unexpected losses. Most significantly, the uncertain treatment creditors
receive in bankruptcy encourages them to rush to state court at the first sign
of the debtor's trouble to receive known state court remedies. Uniformity
would ensure consistent treatment of entirety property and prevent forum
shopping.
VI.

CONCLUSION

It is obvious Congress was unaware of the confusion it created with
section 522. The Eleventh Circuit has not decided this issue, so the treatment
of entirety property remains a debatable issue. This uncertainty will undoubtedly put joint creditors on alert when joint debtors begin to fall behind in
payments on their obligations. Thus, joint creditors' reactions may accelerate
the debtor's decline into bankruptcy.
The new Code represents a significant departure from the old Bankruptcy
Act of 1898 by requiring inclusion of all the debtor's legal and equitable
interests in the estate. From this point, the analysis of the entirety property
becomes a two prong inquiry: (1) to what extent is the debtor's interest exempt under section 522(b)(2)(B), and (2) which creditors will benefit from
the proceeds of the sale of the debtor's interest. The Florida courts differ on
both of these issues.
One approach adopted by the Florida courts exempts the entirety property proceeds in excess of any joint claims in the estate. Under state law, a

194. See supra note 65. An amendment may not provide the best result, but at least it would ensure consistency.
195. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8 (providing Congress with the power to establish uniform bankruptcy laws).
196. In re Boyd, 121 B.R. 622, 625 (Bankr. N.D. Fla. 1989).
197. Anderson, 132 B.R. at 660; In re Amici, 99 B.R. 100, 102-03 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1989).
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joint creditor can only levy on the entirety property interest. Thus, in bankruptcy, the property should be administered for the benefit of joint creditors.
This approach eliminates the inefficiencies caused by the court lifting the
stay and allowing the joint creditor to pursue its claim in state court. Also,
this approach preserves the unique status joint creditors bargained for by
allowing only the joint creditors to share in the proceeds. Consequently, the
substantive rights of the joint creditor are unchanged. However, this approach
ignores the dictates of section 726 by creating a sub-class of creditors not
intended by Congress.
The second approach adopted by the Florida courts recognizes the problems associated with distributing the proceeds in violation of section 726. In
general, the courts hold that if a joint creditor exists on the date of bankruptcy, then the debtor's interest in entirety property is available for distribution
to all creditors. One court modified this result by limiting the amount of the
debtor's interest available for all creditors to the extent of the joint claims in
the case. The courts rely on the rule established by the Supreme Court that
the amount brought into the estate because of the special status of an individual creditor inures to the benefit of all the creditors. Additionally, the Code
does not provide special treatment for joint creditors in bankruptcy. Thus,
this approach is consistent with the Code and produces a more sound result.
A simpler solution would be for Congress to amend the relevant statutes
and clearly articulate the treatment for entirety property. Congress is responsible for establishing uniform bankruptcy laws. An amendment will ensure
consistent treatment and prevent forum shopping. Until Congress responds to
this problem in bankruptcy, the courts will continue to offer different results
for debtors and creditors depending on where the debtor files for bankruptcy.
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